The focus of this paper is on cooperation in compound joint projects. A group of agents aims to work together in a joint project which can have different forms.
Introduction
Cooperation is an essential part of human interaction. Especially environmental problems call for cooperation. Game theory can contribute in smoothening cooperation by developing attractive and transparant rules for the allocation of costs or rewards among the participants in joint projects. There is a huge literature dealing with cost sharing problems using game theory. For surveys see Tijs and Driessen (1986) and Young (1994) .
In this paper we consider situations where agents plan to cooperate in a complex project. The agents have to decide about the form of the project and about the associated cost sharing. Both facets depend on the involved costs and the budgets, which we identify with the rewards, of the agents for the different forms which the project may finally have. In our model fit e.g. cooperation in irrigation systems (cf. Aadland and Kolpin (1998) , Kolpin and Aadland (2001) In an irrigation system the wishes of the participants differ and are determined by the position of the pieces of land owned by the participants. In a railway system intercity trains will have wishes different from local trains etc. In an airport landing network the wishes of the participants depend on the size of their planes and their offered flights.
To make our life not too difficult in this paper we suppose from now on that there is a collection of basic units (components) such that each feasible project consists of a subset of these components, and such that the cost of such a feasible project is equal to the sum of the costs of the involved components. Further we suppose that the benefits increase if the set of involved components increases. In railway projects the basic units are tracks between two neighbouring railway stations and available facilities at the railway stations.
In irrigation systems and in airport landing systems the basic units are ditch pieces and landing strip pieces, respectively.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the formal model of a joint project situation and a related cooperative game. Sufficient conditions are given which guarantee that the game is a convex game. In Section 3 for structured joint projects transparant solutions for related cost sharing problems are introduced, which are based on cost sharing rules from the taxation literature.
Joint project situations and joint enterprise games
A joint project situation is a tuple < N, A, c, F, (R i ) i∈N > where N is the set of agents involved in the cooperation, A is the set of basic units, c : A → R + the cost function,
A the set of feasible projects, and R i : F → R + the reward function of agent i ∈ N. In the following we suppose (J.1) and (J.2), with
We will say that F is a lattice if (J.3) holds, with
We will say that a joint project situation < N, A, c, F, (R i ) i∈N > is based on the tree < V, A >, with root v 0 ∈ V , if the basic units are the arcs of the tree, and if each feasible project consits of the arcs of a subtree of < V, A > with root v 0 .
Note that F is a lattice for tree-based joint project situations.
We suppose that the agents choose a feasible optimal project π 1 where
To solve the cost sharing problem, or equivalently, to solve the problem of dividing the total benefit P i∈N R i (π 1 ) − c(π 1 ), the related cooperative game < N, v >, which we call the joint enterprise game, may be helpful, where for the coalition S ∈ 2 N , the worth v(S) is equal to
Then one can use for this joint enterprise game standard solutions as the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)), the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) or the τ -value (Tijs (1981) ) to solve the benefit allocation problem. Especially in case the game is convex the Shapley value is appealing, because in this case the core is large and the Shapley value is the barycenter of the core. Recall (cf. Shapley (1971) ) that a game < N, v > is a convex game if for all
. In Theorem 2.1 sufficient conditions on a joint project situation are given to guarantee that the corresponding joint enterprise game is convex. A role plays here the supermodularity property of R i for each i ∈ N , if F is a lattice. Recall that R i : F → R + is a supermodular function if
In general, a joint enterprise game is not necessarily convex. Even the core may be empty (cf. Feltkamp et al. (1996) ).
Example 2.1. (A connection problem) Consider the graph < V, A > with vertex set
and a 4 = {v 0 , v 3 }}. Suppose agent i wants to connect v 0 with v i , via a path, where i ∈ N = {1, 2, 3} and the cost of using an arc a equals c(a) = 10. Suppose that F = 2 A and that a right connection corresponds to a benefit 12 for the involved agent.
Then this situation corresponds to the joint project situation < N, A, c, 2 ¢ and is unequal to the unique core element (2, 2, 2). The
, with π 1 = {a 1 , a 2 } and π 2 = {a 3 , a 4 }.
Now we arrive at our main result.
Theorem 2.1. Let < N, v > be the cooperative enterprise game corresponding to the joint project situation < N, A, c, F, (R i ) i∈N >. Suppose that F is a lattice and that R i : F → R + is supermodular for each i ∈ N. Then < N, v > is a convex game.
Proof. Take S, T ∈ 2 N . Let α ∈ F and β ∈ F be such that
Note that from (J.2) it follows
and from the supermodularity of R i
Adding the inequalities in (ii), (iii) and (iv) we obtain
, we obtain from (i) and (v):
Hence, < N, v > is a convex game.
Let us call a function R i : F → R a one-step reward function if there is a b i > 0 and
If F is a lattice, then a one-step reward function is supermodular. From Theorem 2.1 we obtain then Corollary 2.2. Let < N, v > be the joint enterprise game corresponding to the treebased joint project situation < N, A, c, F, (R i ) i∈N > and suppose that the reward functions R i are one-step reward functions. Then < N, v > is a convex game. 
Structured projects and simple cost sharing rules
In this section we want to describe how well-known cost sharing rules for simple cost sharing problems can be helpful for solving in an appealing and transparant manner, the reward sharing problem related to many complex joint project situations. Here a simple cost sharing problem is a tuple < N, c, b >, where N is the set of agents, c ∈ R + is the cost to be paid by the agents and b ∈ R n + , the maximal contribution vector, where b i is the maximum contribution to c, which agent i ∈ N is willing to pay. To use these simple cost sharing rules, for a joint project situation
where (i) π 1 is an optimal plan consisting of m elements of A
A project with such a sequence will be called structured.
Such a sequence will not exist in general. For the case when F = 2 A and also in treebased cases we have a structured project. Given such a sequence σ, let a r be the unique element of π r \π r+1 for r < m and a m the unique element of π m . Let T be the cost sharing rule which will be used. The idea then is to consider m simple cost sharing problems for N , where in the r-th problem the cost c(a r ) has to be shared, and where the maximum contributions of the agents depend on the contributions of the agents in the costs of the first r − 1 problems. To be more formal, given a sequence σ as above and a cost sharing 
It follows straightforwardly from
Concluding, if the players agree about the optimal plan π 1 , the simple cost sharing rule F , and the order a 1 , a 2 , ..., a m in which the cost shares c(a 1 ), c(a 2 ), ..., c(a m ) are determined, then B(T, σ) is the resulting reward distribution in the joint project π 1 .
To illustrate the procedure we give an example.
Example 3.1. Consider the joint project < N, A, c, F, (R i ) i∈N > where N = {1, 2}, A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }, c(a 1 ) = c(a 2 ) = c(a 3 ) = 10, F = {∅, {a 3 }, {a 3 , a 1 }, {a 3 , a 2 }, {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }} and Remark. In a tree-based problem first the cost sharing of a leaf of the original tree is solved, then the cost sharing of a leaf of that tree which we obtain from the original tree by removing the treated leaf. In general the resulting reward distribution depends on the order of treating the simple cost sharing problems.
